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The nature and goals of Russia’s politics 
of memory
Russia’s politics of memory consists of ideas and 
practices designed to shape collective memory 
and historical discourse in a way that serves the 
political interests of the ruling elite. It is imple-
mented by state agencies, state-controlled media 
outlets, a part of academia and a network of 
social organisations. The funding comes from the 
state or from businesses with ties to the Kremlin. 
The politics of memory is intended to be one of 
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The sacralised Soviet victory over Nazism is a central element of the politics of memory, as utilised 
by the Russian state today. It constitutes an important theme in the Kremlin’s ideological offensive 
that is intended to legitimise Russia’s great-power ambitions. The messianic myth of saving the world 
from absolute evil is supposed to cover up the darker chapters of Soviet history and to legitimise all 
subsequent Soviet or Russian wars and military interventions, starting with Hungary, through Czecho- 
slovakia and Afghanistan and ending with Ukraine and Syria. According to the current neo-Soviet 
interpretation, all these military actions were purely defensive and justified by external circumstances. 
The glorification of the “Yalta order” and the justification of the use of force in foreign policy is in-
tended to legitimise Moscow’s pursuit of its current strategic aims, first and foremost of these being 
hegemony in the post-Soviet area and revision of the European security architecture. 
The war mythology and Russia’s great-power ambitions continue to resonate with the wider Russian 
public; thus contributing to legitimisation of the authoritarian regime in the eyes of a large swathe 
of society and offsetting the effect of growing socio-economic problems. The myth of a wartime 
‘brotherhood of arms’ has a smaller impact on other post-Soviet states, which have increasingly been 
distancing themselves – especially since 2014 – from Moscow’s neo-imperial historical narrative. 
The use of historical myths as a form of soft power finds even less resonance in Europe and the US. 
Nevertheless, low susceptibility in the West to Russian historical propaganda does not diminish the 
gravity of the challenge posed by Russian information-psychological warfare, resorting to historical 
falsehoods and specious analogies between the current international situation and political-military 
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the tools for legitimising an authoritarian regime. 
Its significance grows whenever the impact of 
other legitimising factors (economic, political, 
social and international) wanes. 
The current version1 of the Russian politics of 
memory took shape during Vladimir Putin’s third 
presidential term (2012–2018). Its inauguration 
was marred by mass political protests in Moscow, 
which lasted several months and were viewed by 
the Kremlin as the result of a conspiracy by West-
ern intelligence services. Putin’s presidency was 
further overshadowed by economic slowdown, 
which in subsequent years was followed by further 
challenges: the Ukrainian “Revolution of Dignity” 
(also known as the Euromaidan Revolution) at the 
turn of 2013 and 2014 (seen by the Kremlin as 
a threat to the stability of Putin’s regime); West-
ern sanctions, imposed in response to Russia’s 
armed aggression against Ukraine; the financial 
and economic crisis of 2014–2016; and finally, 
the prospect of long-term economic stagnation. 
In addition, the years 2018–2019 were marked by 
growing dissatisfaction and mounting readiness to 
engage in public protests on the part of Russian 
society, faced with declining living standards.
Due to the nature of the Russian political-econom-
ic system2 the ruling elite cannot use economic 
development and growing living standards as the 
basis for its legitimisation. Moreover, the regime 
displays conspicuous ideological void, has failed to 
formulate any attractive vision of the future and 
prioritises political control over economic devel-
opment. Hence, it is forced to seek legitimacy in 
the sphere of foreign, rather than domestic, policy. 
1 For its previous versions see O. Малинова, ‘Тема про-
шлого в риторике президентов России’, Pro et Contra, 
Май–август 2011, www.carnegieendowment.org.
2 For more on the essence of the Russian authoritarian mod-
el, see M. Domańska, Putinizm po Putinie. O „głębokich 
strukturach” rosyjskiego autorytaryzmu, OSW, Warszawa 
2019, www.osw.waw.pl.
The most important factor which influences the 
thinking of Kremlin decision-makers about for-
eign policy and their choice of appropriate policy 
measures to accompany it is the abiding inferiority 
complex produced by the ‘phantom pains’ arising 
from the collapse of the Soviet empire. The ruling 
elite, driven by interests specific to the authoritar-
ian nature of the regime, and incapable of con-
structing a compelling vision of Russian national 
identity (“the national idea”3), decided to utilise 
a time-worn method by reviving the traditional 
international identity of Russia as a great power. 
This identity remains readily comprehensible and 
appealing to the Russian public. The politics of 
memory that largely replicates the Soviet paradigm 
of Russian history, with its strong anti-Western 
thrust, is part and parcel of this project. The revival 
of the traditional great power identity is calculated 
to have a double effect: first, justification of the 
Kremlin’s aggressive foreign policy in the eyes of 
Russian society; second, legitimisation of Russia’s 
great-power ambitions in the eyes of the inter-
national community. The Soviet templates have 
been chosen for a number of reasons. Firstly, for 
the temporal proximity of the USSR with its super-
power status. Secondly, because they offer a set 
of ready-made symbols, which many Russians still 
cherish and find meaningful. Thirdly, such a choice 
reflects the mentality and serves the interests 
of the core beneficiaries of Putinism, i.e. former 
officers of the Soviet security services formed by 
the Cold War-era confrontation with the West. 
Due to the authoritarian philosophy of power and 
the Russian political culture shared by the ruling 
elite,4 the official historical narrative is strongly 
ideologised – it has actually begun to function 
as a sort of substitute for state ideology that is 
banned under the Russian constitution. Its for-
mulation and promulgation creates a “monopoly 
on truth” as the authorities consistently restrict 
3 In 1996, in response to President Boris Yeltsin’s appeal/
request, “Rossiyskaya Gazeta” announced a competition 
for a “national idea”, i.e. a coherent narrative based on the 
common values that could unite all Russians. However, all 
attempts to come up with such an “idea” carried out to 
date have failed.
4 For more on Russia’s political culture, see M. Domańska, 
Conflict-dependent Russia. The domestic determinants of 
the Kremlin’s anti-Western policy, OSW, Warszawa 2017, 
www.osw.waw.pl. 
Russia’s official historical narrative 
is strongly ideologised and subor-
dinated to the goals pursued by 
authoritarian propaganda.
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access to archival sources and limit the freedom 
of historical research. From their perspective, 
“history” is merely an eclectic collection of myths, 
a malleable material from which any narrative can 
be spun arbitrarily. The politics of memory simply 
constitutes an important element of state-spon-
sored propaganda: historical facts and their in-
terpretations are subordinated to the political 
interests of decision makers.
As regards foreign policy, these are long-term in-
terests of a strategic nature. They include: Western 
consent to Russian hegemony over the post-Soviet 
area; revision of the European security architecture 
in line with Moscow’s interests (which means 
marginalisation of NATO regarded by the Kremlin 
as Russia’s main enemy, threatening its very sur-
vival; creation of a security buffer zone in Central 
Europe; provision of the right of veto for Moscow 
in all questions regarding European security); 
limitation of the US’s presence and influence in 
Europe; and finally, unrestricted and unconditional 
opportunities for developing economic and polit-
ical cooperation with the West.5 The myth of the 
‘Great Patriotic War’ of 1941–1945, including its 
key aspect – the 1945 victory over Nazi Germany 
in 1945, is an instrument for legitimising Russia’s 
great-power aspirations. 
The narrative of the Great Patriotic War in Rus-
sian foreign policy
In the mythology which has been constructed to 
serve the current needs of Russia’s foreign policy, 
the sacralisation of the victory in 1945 takes pride 
of place, as a turning point raising the Soviet 
Union to the status of a superpower. This myth 
carries a strong messianic message: it depicts the 
Soviet Union as a state that accomplished a unique 
mission of saving the world from absolute evil. 
As a high-ranking Russian official said, “Europe 
exists today thanks to those Soviet soldiers and 
officers who paid the ultimate price in order to 
5 For more on strategic goals of Russia’s foreign policy 
in Europe, see M. Menkiszak, A strategic continuation, 
a tactical change. Russia’s European security policy, OSW, 
Warszawa 2019, www.osw.waw.pl.
enable its development.6 The loss of over 20 million 
Soviet citizens as a result of the war is exploited 
as a counterargument to invalidate the historical 
narratives of neighbouring states asserting that 
in the 20th century they were victims of Soviet im-
perial expansion. The Russian official narrative of 
the war is framed in religious terms – any attempts 
to question the “canonical” version of events 
are stigmatised as “blasphemous”. The current 
National Security Strategy of the Russian Federa-
tion describes attempts to “revise Russia’s role in 
history” as a threat to the “cultural security” of 
the state.7 In 2014 the Russian parliament adopted 
a law criminalising the “spreading of intentionally 
false information about the Soviet Union’s actions 
during World War II”. It provides for a penalty 
of up to five years in prison.8
Following this logic, Russia consistently protests 
against and denounces critical assessments of the 
foreign policy conducted by the Soviet Union, both 
on the eve of the war (the Molotov–Ribbentrop 
Pact, the USSR’s co-responsibility for the outbreak 
of war) as well as during its course (the attack on 
Poland and Finland, annexation of the Baltic states, 
executions of about 22,000 Polish military officers 
and intelligentsia – known as the Katyń massa-
cre – and mass terror against Soviet citizens and 
inhabitants of the newly annexed territories). To 
deflect and counter such criticism Russia distorts 
or blatantly falsifies historical facts. For example, 
by inventing and spreading a narrative relativizing 
the Katyń massacre (the so-called “anti-Katyń” 
propaganda campaign) that paints this war crime 
6 ‘Вячеслав Володин: правителям, которые затеяли пере-
смотр истории, никто не подаст руку’, Государственная 
Дума, 21 November 2019, www.duma.gov.ru.
7 Стратегия национальной безопасности Российской Феде-
рации до 2020 года, published on 13 May 2009, Президент 
России, www.kremlin.ru.
8 This is the so-called ‘law against rehabilitation of Nazism’ 
(Article 354.1 of the penal code of the Russian Federation) 
of 5 May 2014.
A distorted vision of history is intend-
ed to legitimise Moscow’s strategic 
goals, including the revision of the 
European security architecture.
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as a “just historical revenge” for the spurious 
mass killings of Soviet POWs in Poland during the 
Polish-Soviet war of 1919–1921.9 
The Russian narrative depicts the role of the Soviet 
army in the neighbouring countries in 1944–1945 
as that of unequivocal liberators from German-Na-
zi occupation. For years Moscow has protested 
against the alleged “distortions of historical truth” 
by Russian neighbours who refuse to accept the 
triumphalist rhetoric of “liberation”. What particu-
larly elicits demonstrations of displeasure by Rus-
sian officials is the removal of Soviet-era symbols 
from public space in the states of the former Soviet 
bloc, especially of monuments and memorials 
commemorating the “liberating” role of the Red 
Army. Russian decision makers officially insist that 
such commemorations are not only of moral, but 
also of political significance.10 Examples of Russian 
disinformation activities in this field include: a hys-
terical media campaign which falsely claimed that 
the 2016 Polish law banning the propagation of 
Communism and other totalitarian systems allows 
for the vandalisation of Soviet military cemeter-
ies11; an anti-Czech media campaign triggered 
by the announcement by one of the boroughs of 
Prague, about a planned removal of the statue 
of a Soviet Field Marshal, Ivan Konev12, and of 
a memorial plaque honouring him; and finally, the 
Russia-inspired riots in Tallinn and a large-scale 
9 According to Polish and Russian historians, the main cause 
of high mortality among Soviet prisoners of war were 
infectious diseases that took the lives of 16,000–20,000 
(while Russian propaganda most often cites the inflated 
number of 100,000).
10 See, for example, the statement by Konstantin Kosachev, 
Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Fed-
eration Council: ‘Объявить всемирным наследием’, 
Российская газета, 21 November 2019, www.rg.ru.
11 The law is intended to remove Communist symbols (includ-
ing monuments) from public space, although it protects 
burial sites, graves and cemeteries; prawo.sejm.gov.pl.
12 K. Dębiec, ‘A crisis in the Czech Republic’s relations with 
China and Russia‘, 2 October 2019, www.osw.waw.pl.
cyber-attack on Estonia, following the removal 
of a monument to the “soldiers-liberators” from 
Tallinn’s city centre in 2007. 
Resorting to its routine manipulative techniques, 
which include blatant distortion of historical facts, 
Russian historical propaganda increasingly exploits 
the theme of an alleged co-responsibility of the 
West and Poland for the outbreak of the world 
war in 1939. This theme is being used as a tool in 
the information-psychological war, which is waged 
by Russia against the West, designed in particular 
to weaken the position of those states within the 
Euro-Atlantic community that are advocates of 
determined resistance against Moscow’s aggres-
sive foreign policy. The deliberate falsification of 
historical facts is part and parcel of a confronta-
tional Cold War rhetoric, which for several years 
has overshadowed the memory of the common 
allied struggle back in 1941–1945 (the contribution 
of the Western allies into this fight is deliberately 
played down and glossed over). Among numerous 
official statements betraying such Cold War logic, 
President Putin’s speech at the Victory Day Parade 
in May 2015 deserves particular attention. In what 
was the second year of the war against Ukraine, 
and at a time when Russia was struggling with 
an economic crisis and Western sanctions, he in 
fact warned the West against a repetition of the 
scenario of the late 1930s, pointing out that at that 
time an “enlightened” Europe had underestimated 
the threat posed by Hitlerism, and appealed for 
“vigilance” in the face of contemporary challenges. 
In what was a clear jab at Washington, he also 
developed a theme of alleged dangers posed by 
efforts towards building a unipolar world order 
and by “bloc mentality”. By using such a transpar-
ent analogy, he was hinting that by disregarding 
Russia’s interests the West is fuelling the risk of 
a new war. 
December 2019 saw further escalation of this 
narrative. This time, it was Poland that became the 
target of an unprecedented propaganda offensive 
led by President Putin in person. Inter alia, the 
president devoted almost his entire, hour-long 
speech (at an informal CIS summit) to castigate 
Poland for its alleged close collaboration with 
The sacred myth of victory over Na-
zism serves to cover up the darker 
periods in Soviet and Russian histo-
ry, and to legitimise all subsequent 
wars, including the aggression 
against Ukraine.
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the German Third Reich before the Second World 
War. In subsequent days the allegations contained 
in the speech were echoed repeatedly by Rus-
sian officials and state-controlled media outlets. 
In one of the weekly news programs on the main 
Russian state TV channel, Poland was branded as 
a country whose responsibility for the outbreak of 
war was second only to that borne by the Third 
Reich. It was also accused of being “systemically 
anti-Semitic” while its government was supposedly 
expressing solidarity with Hitler’s plans for “the 
final solution of the Jewish question.” Therefore, 
the anchor claimed, it was not “by chance that 
Nazi extermination camps were located by the 
Nazis on Polish territory”.13
In this context, an evident change in the official 
Russian interpretation of the secret protocols to 
the Molotov–Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact 
is telling – when compared not only with the 
interpretation prevailing in the 1990s,14 but also 
with Soviet discourse (which, when it comes to 
other issues, is often replicated by the current 
official narrative). Until the late 1980s, Soviet au-
thorities consistently denied the existence of the 
secret protocols dividing Central-Eastern Europe 
into German and Soviet zones of influence, while 
presenting the ‘non-aggression pact’ as moti-
vated by purely ‘defensive’ intentions. In Putin’s 
Russia, the official perception of this pact has 
been increasingly positive; in May 2015, during 
a joint press conference with Angela Merkel, Putin 
firmly and unambiguously praised it, citing its vital 
13 See the recording of President Vladimir Putin’s speech 
available at the official website of the President of the 
Russian Federation, www.kremlin.ru; and the recording 
of the TV programme aired on 29 December 2019 ‘«Вести 
недели» с Дмитрием Киселевым(HD) от 29.12.19’, 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9jSpIDeVLVs). 
14 In December 1989, the Congress of People’s Deputies of 
the Soviet Union condemned the fact of signing the secret 
protocol; ‘Постановление Съезда народных депутатов 
СССР о пакте Молотова-Риббентропа от 24.09.1989 г.’, 
документы XX века, www.doc20vek.ru.
importance for the USSR’s national security.15 The 
months and years that followed have seen repeat-
ed manifestations of an increasingly appreciative 
attitude towards the pact. It is no longer presented 
only as a forced step due to the anti-Soviet policy 
of Western Europe but also as a great achievement 
of Soviet diplomacy which Russians can be proud 
of. In June 2019, the original Soviet copy of the 
secret protocol was published for the first time16 
and displayed at an exhibition (“The beginning of 
the Second World War”) at the State Archive of 
the Russian Federation. The depiction of a patently 
aggressive treaty as a justified defensive measure 
suggests that preventive use of force against other 
states can be regarded as a legitimate means of 
pursuing national interests and strengthening 
one’s own security.
This attitude towards the use of force in interna-
tional relations is also manifested by the intention-
al militarisation of war memory, inter alia through 
demonstrations of Russian military power during 
the annual Victory Day parades in Moscow’s Red 
Square. While the display of military prowess has 
been part of these celebrations since 2008, the 
size of the military contingent in the parade held 
to celebrate the latest round anniversary in 2015 
was unprecedented.17 Along with Putin’s speech 
quoted above, it was clearly intended to draw 
15 Similar arguments, referring to the great power’s vital inter-
ests, are used in relation to the Soviet invasion on Finland in 
November 1939. ‘Путин: СССР в войне с Финляндией хотел 
исправить ошибки 1917 года‘, РИА Новости, 14 March 
2013, www.ria.ru.
16 The existence and the wording of the secret protocol were 
revealed in 1989, however its original Soviet copy was not 
published until 2019. 
17 For more on 2015 celebrations see M. Domańska, ‘Russia 
marks the 70th anniversary of the victory over Nazism: What 
significance does it have in an epoch of global confron-
tation?‘, OSW Commentary, no. 171, 20 May 2015, www.
osw.waw.pl. 
Waging its information-psycholog-
ical warfare, Russia often resorts to 
the theme of an alleged co-responsi-
bility of the West and Poland for the 
outbreak of the Second World War.
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a parallel between the Soviet victory over Nazism 
and Russia’s ongoing confrontation with the West. 
With emphasis laid on triumphalist, military as-
pects, the myth of war appeals primarily to the 
image of the victorious state and strong state 
power (as personified by the army), while the 
human dimension of the war is often neglected. 
In the official narrative, the war is associated 
not so much with the suffering of the nation as 
with festive military parades. The ostentatious 
exploitation of military and patriotic symbols that 
state propaganda dazzles the Russian public with, 
often leads to a carnivalisation and trivialisation 
of the theme of war among society itself, and to 
the general public’s conventional participation 
in strongly ideologised rituals; the overall aim 
thereof is to make the public view the use of 
force as a natural and justified tool of Russia’s 
foreign policy.18
The sacred, messianic myth of victory and “lib-
eration”, the blatantly distorted narrative about 
historical facts and the justification of the use of 
force as a tool of foreign policy are all intended 
to uphold Moscow’s efforts to revise the 21st 
century European order in a way that would best 
suit its interests. The narrative of the liberation of 
Europe by the Soviet empire as the only genuine 
opponent of Nazism serves to legitimise the “Yalta 
order” which marked the apogee of Russia-USSR 
great power status. Moscow’s current geopolitical 
ambitions build upon two main elements of this 
order. Although they are implicitly present in inter-
national politics, Russia’s claim to their recognition 
and legitimisation by the international community 
is fundamentally contradictory to the acquis of 
international law. The first one is the division of 
Europe into zones of influence and entrusting 
great powers with keeping these zones stable; 
nowadays, this idea would imply the recognition 
of the post-Soviet area as a sphere of exclusive 
influence, alongside the privileged interests of 
Russia. The other is the concept of “non-equal 
18 Participants of mass events organised on 9 May frequently 
dress their children up in military costumes (this type of 
clothing is increasingly more prevalent); children’s push-
chairs are quite often made up as plywood tanks or jets.
sovereignty”, where only great powers with strong 
military potential enjoy full sovereignty, while the 
independence of other states is limited by defini-
tion: they are expected to consider the interests 
of the powerful international actors as the main 
guideline for their foreign and domestic policies. 
By this logic, Central and East European countries 
are expected to embody Russian security interests 
rather than their own, which would be tantamount 
to the creation of a sort of security buffer zone in 
this region. The West’s positive response to Russian 
demands would thus enable Moscow to intervene 
– in the name of “stabilising” the international sit-
uation – in the European security architecture that 
stems from NATO membership and EU integration. 
At the same time, any reciprocal influence of the 
West on Russia’s activities in its exclusive zone of 
influence and beyond would prove to be illusory, 
due to the well-developed defence mechanisms 
of the Russian authoritarian regime, including the 
strive to tighten Kremlin control over the Russian 
information sphere. 
The biased narrative of the Second World War and 
the Great Patriotic War found its most striking 
practical application in the anti-Ukrainian smear 
campaign that was launched in late 2013 and 
which preceded Russian armed attack on that 
country. It was intended to discredit the Ukrainian 
revolution and justify Russian military response to 
Ukraine’s European aspirations. The latter were 
perceived by the Kremlin as a serious threat to 
Russia’s great-power interests in the post-Soviet 
area. The emotional force of the war lexicon was 
revived at this time: while pro-European Ukraini-
ans were most often called “fascists” or “Nazis”, 
the accusations of an alleged revival of Ukrainian 
“anti-Semitism” and “pogroms” were intended to 
have the strongest propaganda firepower in the 
international arena. The European Union and the 
United States were in turn accused of supporting 
Positive perception of the Molotov–
Ribbentrop Pact serves to legitimise 
preventive use of force against other 
states, as a means of pursuing Rus-
sia’s national interests.
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the “revival of Ukrainian Nazism” (“Banderism”) in 
their alleged attempt to destabilise Russia through 
another “colour revolution” at its borders – this 
time the “fascist” one. The purported NATO plans 
to base its ships and missiles in Crimea were pre-
sented as another reason for Russia’s preventive 
military attack against Ukraine.
From the outset, this attack has been depicted 
as a mission to protect ethnic Russians and the 
Russian-speaking population living in Ukraine from 
the alleged “Nazi” menace, although the Kremlin 
de facto viewed it as a quasi-Cold War ‘proxy war’ 
waged against the West for domination in the 
Russian “traditional sphere of influence”. Thus, 
the European aspirations among Ukrainian society 
were not only disavowed (in accordance with the 
Yalta-style perception of societies being an object 
of international politics, rather than a subject), but 
were also incorporated into the leitmotif of the 
Russian politics of memory, which is the myth of 
an eternal threat coming from the West. At the 
same time, the very idea of Ukrainian statehood 
was discredited, by marshalling arguments that 
echoed Soviet propaganda from the turn of 1930s 
and 1940s, which back then served to justify the 
aggression against neighbouring countries. In the 
spring of 2014, Putin upheld Russia’s violation of 
security guarantees for Ukraine, enshrined in the 
Budapest memorandum of 1994, as a result of 
the “interruption of the continuity of Ukrainian 
statehood” brought about by the “revolution”, 
which – according to him – legitimately nullified 
all Moscow’s commitments vis-a-vis Kyiv.19
19 See ‘Владимир Путин ответил на вопросы журналистов 
о ситуации на Украине‘, Президент России, 4 March 
2014, www.kremlin.ru. The Budapest Memorandum is an 
agreement signed in December 1994, pursuant to which 
the United States, Russia and the United Kingdom provided 
security assurances against threats or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine 
in exchange for Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament.
In 2014 Russia de facto revived the Brezhnev doc-
trine (the doctrine of “limited sovereignty”)20 that 
had been devised to justify military interventions 
in fellow socialist states as a means of self-defence 
against the hostile ideologies of capitalism and 
liberal democracy. Nowadays, as Moscow views 
the post-Soviet area as a sphere of its vital inter-
ests, the role of this hostile ideology is once again 
performed by the liberal-democratic values of 
“colour revolutions”. In an attempt to counterbal-
ance the centrifugal tendencies in the post-Soviet 
space, Moscow is promulgating the notion of the 
“Russian world”: it portrays the former USSR as a 
single universe of Russian language and culture, 
cemented by common historical experience, in-
cluding the brotherhood of arms during the Great 
Patriotic War. Ukraine and Belarus play a special 
role in the “Russian world” project21 as parts of 
the “triune Russian nation”, connected by “eter-
nal” ties with Russia (these countries are thus not 
viewed as fully sovereign).22
Due to its ‘sacred’, ‘messianic’ nature, the Great 
Patriotic War seems to serve as an archetype of 
all “defensive” wars fought later by the USSR and 
Russia (from military interventions in Hungary in 
1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, through Afghan-
istan in 1979, to the wars in Donbass and Syria, 
20 This term refers to the Soviet policy formulated in 1968 in 
order to justify the collective military intervention of the 
Warsaw Pact members in Czechoslovakia. The Brezhnev 
doctrine proclaimed that any threat to socialist rule in any 
state of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe was a threat to 
the socialist community as a whole.
21 The “Russian world” is a concept of a civilisational commu-
nity comprising both ethnic Russians and representatives of 
other nations of the former USSR who identify themselves 
with the Russian language, Russian or Soviet culture and – 
often – the cultural aspects of the Orthodox religion. In the 
2000s, this concept has become a tool of Russian foreign 
policy: a component of Moscow’s soft power as well as 
ideological justification for Russia’s great-power ambitions 
in the post-Soviet area (in their political, economic and 
military dimension).
22 In order to prove the “eternal” nature of these bonds Russia 
presents the Soviet annexation of eastern Poland in 1939 
(later these lands have been called ‘western Belarus’ and 
‘western Ukraine’) as a legitimate recovery of territories 
held by Russia “from time immemorial” (the same argument 
applies to territories annexed by the Russian Empire during 
the partitions of Poland in 18th century).
Russian historical narrative is de-
signed to legitimise the “Yalta or-
der”: the division of Europe into 
spheres of influence and the con-
cept of “non-equal sovereignty”.
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waged since 2014 and 2015 respectively23). Each 
time their goal was to fend off invented or de-
liberately exaggerated threats, including through 
operations carried out in remote areas – in line 
with the logic of forward defence. The need to le-
gitimise Moscow’s great-power ambitions has led 
in recent years to a positive re-evaluation of those 
armed interventions that were long absent from 
the canon of Russia’s politics of memory, reflected 
inter alia by two recent initiatives from State Duma 
deputies. The first one proposed annulling the 
resolution condemning Soviet aggression against 
Afghanistan, passed in 1989 by the Congress of 
People’s Deputies of the Soviet Union. The second 
proposed granting the status of military veterans 
to those who took part in the Soviet interven-
tion in Czechoslovakia. Although these initiatives 
have so far not translated into legal acts or won 
official support from decision-makers, their im-
plementation cannot be ruled out in the future, 
should Russia step up its confrontational course 
in the field of history and ideology. Against this 
background, the narrative of state media outlets 
on the 60th anniversary of the Soviet intervention 
in Hungary (in October 2016) deserves particular 
attention, as it clearly demonstrated the actual 
goals of Russian historical discourse. In one of the 
TV programs, the Hungarian uprising was branded 
the “first colour revolution” in history, alleged-
ly orchestrated by Western intelligence services 
implementing “techniques of turning peaceful 
protest into bloody chaos” and using Nazi militias 
to attain their goals, while the bloody crackdown 
23 The declared goal of the Russian intervention in Syria was 
to organise “forward defence” against Islamic terrorism, 
whereas the actual goal involved waging a proxy war 
against the US (in order to prevent the success of another 
‘colour revolution’ and facilitate Russia’s return to the 
Middle East geopolitical game). The symbolism of Great 
Patriotic War was present even there: in May 2018 an Im-
mortal Regiment march was organised for the first time 
in Syria (such marches are organised annually, on 9th May, 
both in Russia and among Russian diaspora abroad, to 
commemorate those who fought in the 1941–1945 war). 
During this celebration not only the portraits of Great 
Patriotic War soldiers but also photographs of those who 
were killed in the “fight against terrorism” were displayed. 
‘«Приводим детей, чтобы они не забывали про свои 
корни». Как прошел «Бессмертный полк» за рубежом‘, 
Газета.Ru, 8 May 2018, www.gazeta.ru.
on the insurgents was called “restoration of the 
socialist rule of law”24. 
The limited impact of the Russian historical 
narrative
The Russian great power narrative exploiting the 
war mythology is targeted at three main groups 
and has a different appeal to each of them. The 
first group is the Russian public; success stories 
in the field of international politics – both in the 
past and present – serve to overshadow Russia’s 
deepening economic backwardness and the os-
sification of its political system, and to legitimise 
the authoritarian regime. Moreover, as the 1945 
victory is actually the only historical event that 
resonates with large groups of the society, it helps 
to overcome – at least partially and on an ad hoc 
basis – the social atomisation inherited from the 
Soviet era, so as to make Russians feel united and 
rally around the government. Although Russian 
citizens increasingly expect the authorities to focus 
on socio-economic problems, the great-power nar-
rative and – to a lesser extent – the anti-Western 
propaganda that complements it still find con-
siderable support among the people25. However, 
the mobilising potential of militarism is much 
weaker – social support for Russia’s great power 
ambitions wanes whenever the fear of a “real”, 
“big” war emerges.26
The second target group constitutes the post-Sovi-
et elites and societies. Russia exploits the narrative 
of the ‘brotherhood of arms’ in order to cement 
the community of the “Russian world”. In parallel, 
it discredits the opponents of Russian hegemony 
over this area by equating them with “fascists”. 
24 “«Вести недели» с Дмитрием Киселевым”, 23 October 
2016.
25 See public opinion polls available at www.levada.ru.
26 ‘Хотят ли русские войны. Война и террор в восприятии 
россиян‘, Левада-Центр, 23 March 2016, www.levada.ru.
Russian politics of memory reso-
nates mainly with the domestic au-
dience, whereas abroad it is much 
less influential and sometimes even 
counterproductive.
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This is intended to serve the overarching goal of 
coercing its neighbours into economic, political 
and military integration with Russia. However, 
this strategy has not only brought limited results 
so far but often proved to be counterproductive. 
Although in many countries of the post-Soviet 
area the war against Nazism is a constituent part 
of collective memories and the official politics of 
memory, the use of war mythology for the legitimi-
sation of Russia’s great power ambitions generally 
incites growing resistance. This is particularly so 
when it comes to Moscow’s evident readiness to 
maintain its sphere of influence by military means, 
through another ‘holy’ and ‘defensive’ war, if nec-
essary. The year 2014 was a watershed: the annex-
ation of Crimea and the Russian armed attack on 
Donbass revealed the essence of Russian strategy, 
rang alarm bells among post-Soviet leaders, and 
prompted them to revise – at least partially – their 
politics of memory, enhancing the anti-imperial 
and anti-colonial aspects thereof. This not only 
applies in the obvious case of Ukraine27, but also 
in the far less obvious case of Belarus, Russia’s 
most loyal ally. Just as Belarusian authorities have 
been seeking channels for dialogue and cooper-
ation with the West in recent years, they have 
also been gradually reshaping their politics of 
memory with more emphasis on those periods in 
Belarusian history that exemplify the independent 
course of the state and national development. 
Although these changes have not yet affected the 
canonical Soviet narrative of the “Great Patriotic 
War”, deeply rooted in the collective mentality 
of Belarusians, the war is presented primarily in 
terms of national tragedy, and not the triumph 
of the army and state power.28
27 Following the “Revolution of Dignity”, Ukraine started 
a process of radical de-Communisation and de-Sovietisation 
of its politics of memory. The term “Great Patriotic War” 
was supplanted by “Second World War”. The narrative of 
a historically shaped community of Ukrainians and Russians 
has also been abandoned. For more see T.A. Olszański, 
The great decommunisation. Ukraine’s wartime historical 
policy, OSW, Warszawa 2017, www.osw.waw.pl.
28 However, in October 2019 Alyaksandr Lukashenka went as 
far as to assert that the Great Patriotic War was one of the 
“foreign” wars that had raged through Belarusian territory 
over centuries, bringing the Belarusian nation huge losses 
and suffering. ‘Эксклюзивное интервью Президента 
Республики Беларусь Александра Лукашенко телеканалу 
«Хабар»’, 23 October 2019, www.youtube.com. 
The third group to be targeted is the “collective 
West”, i.e. the political establishment and societies 
of Europe and the United States. Beyond local 
groups of Russian diaspora, the sacred-messianic 
narrative of Soviet victory has a marginal impact 
there, as Western societies have developed their 
own coherent narratives about the Second World 
War. Not only are they much less biased than the 
Russian one, owing to the freedom of historical 
research and pluralistic public debates, but they 
are also based on themes that fundamentally 
differ from Russian leitmotifs. Apart from local 
heroic-patriotic myths, it is above all the reluctance 
to militarise historical memory and the recog-
nition of civilian suffering on both sides of the 
front. In addition, in the West the condemnation 
of Nazi Germany is often just one aspect of the 
condemnation of all totalitarian regimes, including 
the Soviet one. This approach was reflected in 
resolutions passed by international organisations, 
which provoked  harsh criticism from Moscow 
(for instance, the 2019 European Parliament’s 
resolution which labelled the Molotov–Ribbentrop 
Pact as an immediate cause of the outbreak of 
the Second World War, and the 2009 resolution 
of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly equating the 
crimes perpetrated by Nazism and Communism). 
*
Ahead of the 75th anniversary of the end of the 
Second World War, one should expect Russia to 
intensify its historical propaganda campaign29. 
In November 2019, Moscow reiterated its demand 
that the UN General Assembly pass a resolution 
in May 2020, adding the victory over Nazism and 
29 In November 2019, when discussing the May 2020 celebra-
tions agenda, Putin reiterated: “We should remember what 
brought this tragedy that took tens of millions of human 
lives; we should remember who collaborated with the Nazis, 
who encouraged them to go to the East; we should remind 
everyone that it was the Soviet Union that played a crucial 
role in defeating the aggressor and liberating Europe and 
the world”. ‘Заседание Совета по межнациональным 
отношениям‘, Президент России, 29 November 2019, 
www.kremlin.ru.
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memorials to soldiers fighting against Nazism 
to the World Heritage List (the official purpose 
of the initiative is to “prevent the rebirth of Na-
zism”30). Granting special protection to the victory 
obtained in 1945 would enable Russia to exert 
moral and legal pressure on other states (or even 
to interfere in their internal affairs) on issues that 
are politically sensitive for the Kremlin, such as 
the legal status of monuments commemorating 
Soviet soldiers or claims made against Moscow in 
connection with the annexation of a number of 
30 In 2019, this initiative was lent official support from the 
members of the Council of the Interparliamentary Assembly 
of the Commonwealth of Independent States and by the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
territories back in 1939–1945. Russia could also 
demand restrictions on the freedom of historical 
research in other countries, thus trying to draw 
a veil over dark chapters in Soviet history. While 
adoption of the postulated resolution remains 
highly uncertain, the very debate over it would 
furnish Russia with another tool and platform for 
its “memory war” as a component of a broader 
anti-Western, great-power ideological offensive. 
The less that Russia has to offer in the future, both 
to its own citizens and the international com-
munity, the more importance the myth of Great 
Patriotic War will acquire, remaining a peculiar 
allegory of eternal return to the golden age of 
bygone superpower status.
